Abstract. We propose variations of the class of hidden monomial cryptosystems in order to make it resistant to all known attacks. We use identities built upon a single bivariate polynomial equation with coefficients in a finite field. Indeed, it can be replaced by a "small" ideal, as well. Throughout, we set up probabilistic encryption protocols, too. The same ideas extend to digital signature algorithms, as well. Our schemes work as well on differential fields of positive characteristic, and elsewhere.
Introduction
This paper focuses on Hidden Monomial Cryptosystems, a class of public key cryptosystems first proposed by Imai and Matsumoto [?] . In this class, the public key is a set of polynomial nonlinear equations. The private key is the set of parameters that the user chooses to construct the equations. Before we discuss our variation, we review briefly a simplified version of the original cryptosystem, better described in [?] . The characters met throughout this paper are:
• Alice who wants to receive secure messages;
• Bob who wants to send her secure messages;
• Eve, the eavesdropper. Alice takes two finite fields F q < K, q a power of 2, and β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n a basis of K as an F q -vector space. Next she takes 0 < h < q n such that h = q θ + 1, and gcd(h, q n − 1) = 1. Then she takes two generic vectors u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) upon F q , and puts 1 :
(1) v = u q θ u.
The condition gcd(h, q n − 1) = 1 is equivalent to requiring that the map u −→ u h on K is 1↔1 ; its inverse is the map u −→ u h ′ , where h ′ is the inverse multiplicative of h modulo q n − 1.
In addition, Alice chooses two secret affine transformations, i.e., two invertible matrices A = {A ij } and B = {B ij } with entries in F q , and two constant vectors c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) and d = (d 1 , . . . , d n ). Now she sets:
(2) u = Ax + c and v = By + d.
Recall that the operation of raising to the q k -th power in K is an F q -linear transformation. Let P (k) = {p (k) ij } be the matrix of this linear transformation in the basis β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n , i.e.:
(3) β
for 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n. Alice also writes all products of basis elements in terms of the basis, i.e.:
(4)
for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Now she expands the equation (1). So she obtains a system of equations, explicit in the v, and quadratic in the u. She uses now her affine relations (2) to replace the u, v by the x, y. So she obtains n equations, linear in the y, and of degree 2 in the x. Using linear algebra, she can get n explicit equations, one for each y as polynomials of degree 2 in the x. Alice makes these equations public. Bob to send her a message (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), substitutes it into the public equations. So he obtains a linear system of equations in the y. He solves it, and sends y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) to Alice.
To eavesdrop, Eve has to substitute (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) into the public equations, and solve the nonlinear system of equations for the unknowns x.
When Alice receives y, she decrypts:
In Eurocrypt ′ 88 [?] , Imai and Matsumoto proposed a digital signature algorithm for their cryptosystem. At Crypto ′ 95, Jacques Patarin
[?] showed how to break this cryptosystem. He noticed that if one takes the equation v = u q θ +1 , raises both sides on the (q θ − 1)-th power, and multiplies both sides by uv, he gets the equation uv q θ = u q 2θ v that leads to equations in the x, y, linear in both sets of variables. Essentially the equations do not suffice to identify uniquely the message, but now even an exhaustive search will be feasible. The system was definitively insecure and breakable, but its ideas inspired a whole class of public key cryptosystems and digital signatures based on structural identities for finite field operations [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?] .
Actually, the security of this class lies on the difficulty of the problem of solving systems of polynomial equations. This problem is hard iff the equations are randomly chosen. All manipulations aim to make equations seem like that. If they really were random, the problem is hard to Alice, too.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop our own, new cryptosystem. Alice builds her public key by manipulations as above, starting from a certain bivariate polynomial. All of Alice's manipulations are meant to hide from Eve this polynomial. It is the most important part of the private key. Its knowledge reduces decryption to the practically easy problem of solving a single univariate polynomial.
In the third we discuss some security issues. There we explain that practically all bivariate nonlinear polynomials are good to us to give raise to a public key. This plentitude of choices is an important security parameter.
In the fourth section we provide our cryptosystem with a digital signature algorithm. In the fifth one we provide one more encryption protocol, now a probabilistic one, in the sense that to the same cleartext correspond zero, one, or more cyphertexts.
In the sixth one we discuss some more variations. Essentially, we replace the single bivariate polynomial by an ideal of a small size.
In the seventh section we mention what Shannon [?] calls Unconditionally Secure Cryptosystems. Actually, this class of cryptosystems is considered an exclusive domain of private key cryptography. This is due mostly to the unhappy state of art of public key cryptography.
In the eighth one we extend our constructions to differential fields of positive characteristic. We hope they are the suitable environment for unconditionally secure public key cryptosystems.
A New Cryptosystem
2.1. Key Generation. Alice chooses two finite fields F q < K, and a basis β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n of K as an F q -vector space. Next she takes a generic (for now) randomly chosen bivariate polynomial:
Y ], such that she is able to find all its roots in K with respect to X; ∀ Y ∈ K, if any. For the range of i employed, this is nowadays considered a relatively easy problem. Further, f (X, Y ) is subject to other few constraints, that we make clear at the opportune moment. In transforming cleartext into ciphertext message, Alice will work with two intermediate vectors, u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ); u, v ∈ K. She sets:
For a ij = 0, she sets somehow:
where θ ik , θ jk n i , n j , ∈ N * . Here somehow means that (7) need not be the q-ary representation of i, j. Indeed, there is no reason for it to be. We allow to each i both opportunities: to be or not to be. Doing so we increase our choices, whence the random-looking of the public key.
In any fashion, what we are dealing with, are nothing but identities. Next Alice substitutes the (7) to the exponents in (6), obtaining:
that is:
Recall that the operation of raising to the q k -th power in K is an F q -linear transformation. Let
ℓm } be the matrix of this linear transformation in the basis β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n , i.e.:
(10) β
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Alice also writes all products of basis elements in terms of the basis, i.e.:
(11)
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
Now she substitutes
. . , v n ), and the identities (10), (11) to (9), and expands. So she obtains a system of n equations of degree t in the u, v, where:
Every term under Σ in (7) contributes by one to the degree in the u of the polynomials.
Here we pause to give some constraints on the range of i, j in (6). The aim of this section is to generate a set of polynomials; linear in a set of variables, and nonlinear in another one. For that purpose, we relate (6) and (7):
On the other side, the size of public key will be O((2n) t+1 ). So, it grows polynomially with n, and exponentially with t. Therefore, we are interested to keep t rather modest, e.g., t = 2, 3 or so. So, we have to choose i, j in (5), (7) in order to keep t under a forefixed bound.
Next, Alice chooses A = {A ij }, B = {B ij } ∈ GL(F q ), c, d ∈ K, and sets:
where x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) are vectors of variables. Now she substitutes (13) to the equations in the u, v above, and expands. So she obtains a system of n equations of degree t in the x, y; linear in the y, and nonlinear in the x.
After the affine transformation, in each equation appear terms of each degree, from zero to t; before not. This is its use; to shuffle terms coming from different monomials of (9).
At this point, we are ready to define the cryptosystem.
2.2. The Protocol. With the notations adopted above, we define the HPE Cryptosystem (Hidden Polynomial Equations) as the public key cryptosystem such that:
• The public key is: -The set of the polynomial equations in the x, y as above; -The field F q ; -The alphabet: a set of elements of F q .
• The private key is:
-The polynomial (5); -A, B, c, d as in (13); -The identities (6) to (11); -The field K.
Bob separates the cleartext M by every n letters. If needed, he completes the last string with empty spaces. Next he takes an n-tuple x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of M, substitutes it to the x in the public equations, solves with respect to the y, and sends y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) to Alice. We assume here that the solutions exist, and postpone the case they do not.
• Decryption: (6), and finds all solutions within K. There is at least one. Indeed, if x is Bob's cleartext, u as in (13) is one. For each solution u, she solves:
and represents all solutions in the basis β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n . It takes a Chinese Remainder Theorem. With probability ≈ 1, all results but one, Bob's (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), are gibberish, or even stretch out of the alphabet.
2.3. Remarks.
2.3.1. The risc of uncertain decryption is quite virtual. It equals the probability that another sensate combination of letters x satisfies (14) for any root u of (6) for Bob's y, besides the good one that always does. Afterwards, the undesired solution has to join well with the other parts of the decrypted message.
The main suspended question is that of existence of solutions.
Well, Bob succeeds to encrypt a certain message x iff Alice's equation (6) has solutions for u as in (13) for that x. Alice's polynomial is a random one. It is a well-known fact from algebra that the probability that a random polynomial of degree m with coefficients upon a field F q n has a root in it is about 1 − 1 e ≈ 63.2% [?, ?] . Now the remedy is probabilistic. Alice renders the alphabet public with letters being sets of F q . Bob writes down a plaintext and gives start to encryption. If he fails, he substitutes a letter of the cleartext with another one of the same set, and retries.
After s trials, the probability he does not succeed is ≈ 1 e s ; sufficiently small for the algorithm to be trusted to succeed.
2.3.3. The other problem is that Alice may have to distinguish the right solution among a great number of them. Here we propose a first remedy. Her number of solution is bounded above by the degree in X of f . So, it is beter to her to keep this degree moderate. Later in this paper in other settings, there will be other remedies, too.
There are no bounds on the degree in Y . It can be taken whatsoever huge.
2.3.4. Solving univariate polynomial equations is used by Patarin, too [?, ?] . He takes a univariate polynomial:
and with manipulations like ours, both the same as Imai-Matsumoto [?], he gets his public key; a set of quadratic equations. He uses two affine transformations to shuffle the equations. We claim that the first one adds nothing to the security. The bigger the degree of f is, the more the public key resembles a randomly chosen set of quadratic equations. So, it is a security parameter. On the other side, it slows down decryption, principally by adding a lot of undesired solutions. To face that second problem, to the public key are added other, randomly chosen, equations. This is its Achilles' heel. It makes the public key overdefined, therefore subject to certain facilities to solve [?] . So, it weakens the trapdoor problem.
We do not add equations to discard undesired solutions. So, we are not subject to overdefined stuff. If in certain variations we do add, we need to add less equations, however. We label wrong solutions those that after decrypted do not make sense, or stretch out of the alphabet.
Afterall, all decrypted texts will howsoever be in a comprehensible language (to someone or some wedget). As n grows, it is less possible to have more than one meaningful solution. Besides, any monkey solution that appears to Alice, appears to Eve, too. Furthermore, Eve may have more meaningful solutions. If desired, other tests can be introduced for that purpose. There is no need, however. The solutions, the good one and the bad ones, are very few; no more than m.
A big advantage of our settings is that we need a lower degree polynomial in X. So, we make the presence of undesired solutions virtual. Decryption is a pure linear algebra matter.
What is most important, we have now a practically infinite range of choices of f . This is not Patarin's case. There the choices are bounded below because of being easy to attack cases, and above because of being impractical to legitimate users.
The only few constraints we put on its monomials aim to:
• keep public key equations linear in the y;
• have less undesired solutions in decryption process;
• keep the size of public key moderate;
• keep all public key equations nonlinear in th x. We can take the degree in y unreasonably high. It gives no trouble to us. It suffices that all the powers of y that appear in the monomials of f are powers of q, so the public equations come linear with respect to the y.
A new facility now is that we can take lower degree in x, as multiple linear attack does not anymore apply, hopingly.
The constraint that all public key equations must be nonlinear in the x is the only non-negotiable one. Indeed, if Alice violates it, the trapdoor problem becomes fatally easy to Gröbner techniques.
Back to the degree in the y of the public key. Assume that the public key equations are not linear in the y. Once Bob substitutes the x in the public equations, he now is not challenged to solve a nonlinear system of equations. He is only required to find one solution of it. This can be done within polynomial time with respect to the total degree of the system. Later we give settings to keep public key nonlinear of modest degree in the y.
Each of such solutions (if any) is encryption to the same cleartext. So we have set up a probabilistic encryption protocol. To a single cleartext may correspond zero, one, or more ciphertexts.
So, in conclusion, Alice is allowed to take for the construction of her public key any damned bivariate polynomial. Indeed, we later argue that f can quite well be a multivariate polynomial.
We hope this plentitude of choices is a spoil-sport to Eve.
Security Issues
Apparently, the only things Eve knows, are the system of public equations, and the order of extension. By brute force, she has to take (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ), to substitute it in the public key equations, to solve in Z, or maybe Z[α], and to take the sensate solution. Almost surely, there is only one good solution among those that she finds. She has to find it among t n of them. However, the main difficulty to her is just solving the system. Supposedly, it will pass through the complete computation of Gröbner basis. It is a well-known hard problem. The complexity of computations upon a field grows at most twice exponentially with respect to the number of variables, and in the average case, exponentially.
So, it is better to take n huge. This diminishes the probability that Alice confuses decryption, however close to zero, and, what is most important, this renders Eve's task harder.
Alice and Bob will have to solve sets of bigger systems of linear equations, and face Chinese Remainder Theorem for bigger n.
There exist well-known facilities [?] to solve overdefined systems of equations. Unlike most of the rest, our public key is irrendundant, so it is not subject to such facilities. Now, by exhaustive search we mean that Eve substitutes the y in the public equations, and tries to solve it by substituting values to x.
If we have d letters each of them being represented by a single element of F q , the complexity of an exhaustive search is O(d n ). It is easy for Alice to render exhaustive search more cumbersome than Gröbner attack. The last one seems to be the only choice to Eve.
We did not find any Known Cleartext Attack to our cryptosystem. Eve may engineer cleartext ↔ ciphertext analyses, seeking for invariants or regularities there, helpful for an attack [?] . All the identities we use, mean totousle any such regularity, and to disguise from Eve any hint on i, j, and on the entries of A, B, c, d, and the a ij ; that she may use for such an attack.
The complexity of the trapdoor problem is O(t n ), the size of public key O(n t+1 ). This fully suggests the values of parameters. n = 100, t = 2, 3, 4 would be quite good choices.
Obviously, infinitely many bivariate polynomials give raise to the same public key. Indeed, fixed the ground field, the degree of extension n, and the degree of public key equations, we have a finite number of public keys. On the other hand, there are infinitely many bivariate polynomials that can be used like private keys.
On how does it happen, nothing is known. If ever found, any such regularity will only weaken the trapdoor problem.
A Digital Signature Algorithm
Assume that we are publicly given a set of hash functions that send cleartexts to strings of integers of fixed length n B . For the only purpose of signing messages for Alice, Bob builds a cryptosystem as above with q B prime, and [K B : F q B ] = n B . He to sign a message M:
• calculates H(M) = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n B ) = y ∈ K B ;
• finds one solution (if any; otherwise, see section 2.3.2.) u of f B (u) = y in K B .
• calculates x = B −1 (u − c B ); • appends x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n B ) to M, encrypts, and sends it to Alice. (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n B ) is a signature to M. To authenticate, Alice first decrypts, then she:
• calculates H(M) = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n B );
• substitutes (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n B ), (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n B ) to Bob's public equations; • so she gets an n B -tuple of integers. If they all reduce to zero modulo q B , she accepts the message; otherwise she knows that Eve has been causing trouble. If Eve tries to impersonate Bob and send to Alice her own message with hash value y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n B ), then to find a signature (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n B ), she may try to find one solution of Bob's system of equations for y. We trust on the hardness of this problem for the security of authentication.
A Probabilistic Encryption Protocol
With the ideas described above, we are going to set up now a probabilistic protocol such that only the legitimate users can send messages to which-another. Mean, the message is meaningful iff there are no intruders. Its being meaningful is the signature itself.
Here is the shortest possible description. Let F A and F B be Alice's and Bob's public keys functions respectively, where n A = n B . To send a message x to Alice, Bob sends her a random (this randomness is the probabilistic pattern) element of F A (F −1 B (x)), that she can decrypt by
B (x)) = ∅. Otherwise, the approach is probabilistic, as in the previous section.
Here is the extended description. Each (English, e.g.) letter (or some of them, only) is represented by a set of few (two, e.g.) elements of the field, or strings of them. For ease of explanation, Bob's public equations are linear in the x, and of higher degree in the z.
Bob writes down the cleartext x and finds one solution of:
If there are no solutions, Bob changes a representant of a letter, and retries. Probability issues are discussed in the previous section. Now Bob takes the solution z of (15), and applies:
Next he takes y ′ , substitutes in Alice's public equations. So he obtains a tuple y, that he sends to Alice. This is the ciphertext.
Each of other solutions of (15) give raise to other encryptions of the same cleartext.
Alice now to decrypt, solves her equation for y within her field K. There is at least one solution. Next she applies her inverse affine transformation to all (few) solutions, and substitutes them all on Bob's public equations. Of that procedure all, Alice now discards all meaningless solutions, and takes the meaningful one.
What is the trapdoor problem now? Well, on authentication matter, nothing new. Eve has the same chances to forge here that she had before. Recall that this kin of signatures is already best with respect to the other ones.
On security, instead, there is a very good improvement. By brute force, Eve has to take the ciphertext, substitute on Alice's public key, find all solutions, and substitute them all on Bob's public key; then take the sensate ones. This is worse than exhaustive search of previous cryptosystems. Now, what does here really mean exhaustive search? Eve now has to search through all the elements of the common public ground field, not just through all the alphabet. So, opting for this protocol, we can put a lot of constraints on alphabet, in order to discard far easier the undesired solutions, without rendering the public key overdefined.
She sets up such n-tuples, checks whether they are solutions of Alice's public key for Bob's ciphertext y substituted to the variables y. If yes, she substitutes to Bob's public key, and checks whether does it make sense.
What can linear multiple attack or quadratic attack [?] do in these new settings?
Apart all, we save space and calculi. We do not need any more the calculi and space of signature.
This protocol can be used for multiple encryption, too.
Let us suppose that the letters are strings of a fixed length. Well, here Alice can impose that not all strings are letters. So, in decryption she discards a priori the solutions that contain non-letters. Doing so, she actually has a single good solution of her polynomial, and saves herself the effort of appealing to other tricks. In all the other schemes throughout, such a trick fatally weakens the exhaustive search.
Hidden Ideal Equations
Instead of a single bivariate polynomial, Alice may choose to employ an ideal of a very modest size. She separates the variables she employs into two sets, {X i }, {Y j }; one for encryption, one for decryption. She may decide to leave one of the equations employed of higher degree in the {Y j } after manipulations, so she gives raise to a probabilistic encryption protocol. Alice's parameters are:
• n = [K :
• the number r of private equations.
So, the number of public key equations is n · r. The number of the variables x ij is n · s 1 , and that of the y kl is n · s 2 .
Alice's number of variables, the {X i }, is insignificant so far, so she is supposed to be able to appeal to Gröbner stuff in order to solve her system of equations within the field of coefficients for Bob's {Y j }.
What is most important here and throughout, if Bob succeeds to encrypt, Alice does always succeed to decrypt.
For ease of treatment, assume now that Alice does not apply affine transformations to her variables. Bob fails encryption for a certain cleartext (X 1 , . . . X s 1 ) iff Alice's private ideal has no solutions in the Y for such an (X 1 , . . . X s 1 ). Alice's private ideal is a random one. If she takes r ≤ s 2 , the probability that it has no solutions is ≈ 0, and ≈ 1 for r > s 2 . So, it suffices that Alice takes r ≤ s 2 . The critical cases that may supervene are faced simply changing alphabet.
With slight changes, this reasoning holds in the case that Alice applies affine transformations, too.
The real problem is indeed that the solutions to Alice may be too many; and in any case finitely many, as the base field is finite. The best remedy to that is that Alice takes r = s 1 . So, the ideal that she obtains after substitution of Bob's ciphertext is zerodimensional (quite easy to cause it happen), and the number of solutions is bounded above by the total degree of the system. So, she can contain the number of solutions by taking the total degree in the {X i } modest, and however each of them nonlinear.
Alice can take all equations of very low degree in the X, and then transform that basis of the ideal they generate to another one of very high degrees in the X. So she has a low Bezout number of the ideal, and higher degrees in the X, and transformations as above can take place. If she takes the first basis linear, the number of solutions of her equations reduce to one: Bob's cleartext.
As soon as r > s 1 , the public key becomes overdefined. Alice applies a permutation to the equations and a renumeration to the variables before publishing her key, so Eve does not know how are they related. She may apply affine transformations, or may not, or may apply to only some of the X i , Y j ; at her discretion.
If s 1 < s 2 , the size of the ciphertext is bigger than that of cleartext, and nothing else wrong. By this case, encryption is practically always probabilistic. Indeed, even when the equations are linear with respect to the y kl , since there are more variables than equations, the solutions exist, and are not unique.
Actually, Alice can take s 2 rather huge. She may choose to manipulate some of the Y j within a subfield of K, rather than within K. Doing so, she allows herself a big s 2 , and a contained size of the ciphertext. The number of the variables y kl now is no more n · s 2 .
6.1. Now the size of the public key is O(s 1 (n) t+1 ), and the complexity of the trapdoor problem is O(t n·s 1 ). It is true that throughout the size of public key grows polynomially with n, but before n becomes interesting, the public key is already quite cumbersome. So, opting for the choices of this section we have reasonable security with much smaller values of n. n = 20, or so, actually are quite good. We are allowed some more values of t, too.
6.2. There exist classes of ideals called with doubly exponential ideal membership property [?] . These are the ideals for which the calculus of a Gröbner basis cannot be done within exponential time on the number of variables, i.e., it can be done within doubly exponential time on the number of variables. It is very interesting to know whether can we employ them in some fashion in this class of cryptosystems. In any fashion, this is the theoretical limit for employing solving of polynomial systems of equations in public key cryptography.
Some Considerations
The idea of public key cryptography was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman [?] . Since then, it has seen several vicissitudes [?] .
A trapdoor function is a map from cleartext units to ciphertext units that can be feasibly computed by anyone having the public key, but whose inverse function cannot be computed without knowledge of the private key:
• either because (at present, publicly) there is no theory to do it;
• or the theory exists, but the amount of calculations is deterring.
Cryptosystems with trapdoor problems of the first kin are what Shannon [?] calls Unconditionally Secure Cryptosystems.
Actually, the aim is to make trapdoor problems be equivalent to timehonoured hard mathematical problems. However, being of a problem hard or undecidable implies nothing about the security of the cryptosystem [?, ?] . Recall that of all schemes ever invented, only two of them, RSA [?] and ECDL [?] , are going to be broken (or, at least, are going to become impractical) by solving the hard problems they lie upon. The rest of them have been broken with theories of no use to solve their hard problem. So, once more, it may happen to be proved that solving systems of differential&integral equations is undecidable, nevertheless several cryptosystems built upon them may be easy to break rather than secure.
The author is very fond of the idea of public key cryptography, and believes howsoever in new developments that will make it fully suffice for all purposes.
Actually, one tendency is that of investigating poor structures, mean, structures with less operations, like groups, semigroups with cryptosystems upon the word problem [?, ?, ?]. Yamamura's paper [?] can be considered pioneering on secure schemes. Unfortunately, its scheme is still uneffective.
William Sit and the author are investigating cryptosystems upon other algebraic structures. We are investigating among other things whether is it possible to build effective secure schemes upon differential fields of positive characteristic. We hope that cryptography will arouse new interests on differential and universal algebra, too, as it did in number theory and arithmetic geometry. One reason of optimism is that in universal algebra one can go on further with new structures and hard or undecidable problems forever. Until now we have appealed to only the unary and binary arithmetic operations.
Generalizations on Differential Fields
Differential algebra is born principally due to the efforts of Ritt [?] to handle differential equations by means of algebra. Actually, a differential field is a field with a set of unary operations ′ called derivatives that replace an element of the field with another one such that (a + b)
Good references in the topic are [?, ?, ?, ?, ? ]. Kaplansky's book is probably the best introduction in the topic.
It is possible 2 to generalize the schemes given throughout using differential polynomials instead of (5). Take K to be a finite differential field extension of a differential field F of positive characteristic 3 . Any such K is defined by a system of linear homogeneous differential equations, and there are structural constants defining the operations for the derivations (one matrix for each derivation), as well for multiplication.
One can now replace (5) with a differential polynomial. The scheme works verbatim. One can take (5) to be of higher order and degree, that is ok too, just like the algebraic case. Euler, Clairaut, or any of other well-studied classes of equations, or their compositions; each of them fully suffice.
The techniques described above for polynomials, if applied to differential polynomials, will definitely make it much harder to attack any protocol developed. Any affine transformation (by this is meant a linear combination of the differential indeterminates with not-necessarily constant coefficients, and this linear combination is then substituted differentially in place of the differential indeterminates) will not only even out the degrees, but also the orders of the various partials, and making the resulting differential polynomial very dense.
However, there is one thing to caution about: any time one specifies these structural matrices, they have to satisfy compatibility equations. In the algebraic case, it is the relations between P k = {p ij (k) } in (10) and M ℓ = {m ijℓ } in (11). The P k are simply determined uniquely by M ℓ , given the choices implicitely defined in (11).
It is very interesting to know in the algebraic case whether the system of equations Alice obtains is invariant under a change of basis, all other settings being equal. There is probably some group of matrices in GL(n, q) that can do that. Such a knowledge may be used to build attacks to all schemes of HF E class.
In the differential case there is a similar action called Loewy action, or the gauge transformation. For ordinary differential equations, two matrices A, B are Loewy similar if there is an invertible matrix K such that A = δK · K −1 + KBK −1 . Using this action, one can classify the different differential vector space structures of a finite dimensional vector space. There is also a cyclic vector algorithm to find a special basis, so that the differential linear system defining the vector space becomes equivalent to a single linear ODE.
If no other problems arise for the differential algebraic schemes, there is however one caution more for them to be unconditionally secure. We have to avoid the exhaustive search. For that, Alice has to publish a finite alphabet where each letter is represented by an infinite set, disjoint sets for different letters. This is possible in differential fields, as they are infinite. Alice renders the sets public parametrically, as differential algebraic functions of elements of the base differential field, and parameters, e.g., in Z. Bob chooses a letter, gives random values to parameters, obtains one representant of the letter, and proceeds as above. In any case, if µ is the order of public equations, any two elements Ξ, Θ ∈ F such that (Ξ − Θ) (µ) = 0 must represent the same letter, if any.
The main care for Alice is that the public key equations must not fall into tractable classes by well-known means, such as linear algebra.
In the algebraic case such constructions do not make sense. Eve can anyway appeal to Gröbner attack. Besides, in any fashion such data enable her to guess q.
The size of the public key now is actually O(n to+1 ), where o is the order of public key equations. Quite explosive. However, a first tool to contain it is the low characteristic of the field. So, we see a lot of monomials reduce to zero. The best consolation is that we do not have to go far away with parameters. The trapdoor problem is simply undecidable. n = 20 would fully suffice. Such a value is needed more in order to avoid uncertain decryption, however less probable in differential fields, as the range of solutions is infinite, than for growing security. Besides, if there was found some attack for the HDP E (Hidden Differential Polynomial Equations) scheme, it will work better with HP E. As of now, HDP E trapdoor problem seems undecidable, and the scheme effective. The author is working to come up with concrete examples of this kind of cryptosystems. Unfortunately, everything in the topic is still handmade, and therefore rather time-consuming.
